Phil Conran

"There are no American ground combat troops in Laos."President Richard Nixon, March 6, 1970
Major Philip J. Conran was awarded the Air Force Cross on May 20, 1970, a downgrade from the recommended Medal of Honor. Why was it downgraded? President Nixon certainly did not want to disclose we actually did have American troops in Laos.
On October 6, 1969, then USAF Major Philip J. Conran, piloting a CH-3 helicopter at a classified location in Laos, had just minutes to make a critical decision whether to rescue his downed comrades or fly safely back to the home base. Fortunately for his comrades on the ground, he chose to attempt the rescue even though the heavily armed North Vietnamese combat soldiers were waiting. He knew that if he didn’t make the attempt to rescue the men, they had very little chance of survival. For his heroic actions, he was recommended the Medal of Honor by his commanding officer.
“I retired in 2004 after 40 years in CIA special operations, serving in many trouble spots around the world in that time frame. I have seen several acts of the highest level of courage in my career, but none came close to Phil Conran’s actions at Muang Phin. I strongly believe he should have been awarded the Medal of Honor and never understood why he could be awarded the Air Force Cross for actions in Laos and not the Medal of Honor performed in the same country."
​Bruce Lehfeldt, CIA Special Operations

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 ​TRUTH - JUSTICE - HONOR

Subject: USAF Col. (Ret) Philip J. Conran - Indelible Legacy - Valor Denied

We write to you today about a sacred bond – the promise we make to honor extraordinary valor with our nation's highest recognition. This is not merely about regulations or paperwork. This is about keeping faith with one of our own. This is the story of Phil Conran, a man whose extraordinary valor in 1969 was recognized, documented, and then -through circumstances shrouded in missing paperwork and lost files—denied his rightful honor.
The Letter of the Law: 10 USC § 9271. 
The Medal of Honor requires "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty." The original 1,020-word recommendation for Phil Conran meticulously detailed actions that embodied every element of this standard. This wasn't a marginal case. This wasn't a close call. The extensive detail in that recommendation - over 1,000 words of specific, documented valor - stands in stark contrast to the abbreviated 159-word Air Force Cross citation that ultimately resulted.
What happened to those 861 missing words? What gallantry was deemed unworthy? We cannot know because the record of that decision has vanished.
The Missing Record: A Fatal Flaw
This is not a minor procedural irregularity. The complete absence of any documentation explaining why Conran's Medal of Honor recommendation was downgraded creates a legal vacuum that cannot be filled with assumptions. The Supreme Court established in SEC v. Chenery Corp, 332 U.S. 194 (1947) that agencies cannot retroactively justify their decisions. Without the original rationale, any defense of the downgrade is, by definition, a post-hoc rationalization prohibited under law.
The Air Force today cannot tell us why the Medal of Honor was denied in 1969 because those records are gone. How can a decision stand when its very foundation has crumbled to dust?
A Matter of Equal Treatment
If we look to precedent, the case becomes even clearer. USAF CMSgt Etchberger received the Medal of Honor posthumously in 2010 for classified operations in Laos—the very same environment where Conran served with distinction. Etchberger's citation contained fewer words than Conran's original recommendation. Six Army soldiers received Medals of Honor retroactively for actions in 1969 in the same denied areas of Laos and Cambodia. All fourteen USAF Vietnam-era Medal of Honor recipients demonstrated valor comparable to Conran's.
The question becomes unavoidable: Why them and not him? What principled distinction can be drawn when the original rationale has disappeared?
The Failure of "Presumption of Regularity"
The Air Force Board has leaned heavily on the "presumption of regularity"—the assumption that officials performed their duties correctly in 1970. However, this presumption crumbles when records are missing. As established in O'Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. A. 36  (1991), when government records are lost, the burden shifts, and doubts must be resolved in favor of the veteran.
The Air Force claims to have conducted "de novo" reviews, but this is legally impossible without access to the complete original record. You cannot fully reconsider a case when crucial evidence has vanished.
The Inconsistency That Undermines Integrity
The refusal to equate Conran's actions with Etchberger’s, or the six Army cases, or the 14 Vietnam-era USAF cases exposes a troubling inconsistency in how we honor valor. These disparities don't just harm one man; they undermine the integrity of our entire system of military honors. When similar actions receive different recognition based on lost paperwork rather than merit, public trust in that system erodes.
The Weight of Circumstantial Evidence
While direct evidence of political influence in Conran's case may be lacking, we cannot ignore the context. Operations in Laos were politically sensitive during Nixon's administration. Awards related to these operations were systematically minimized. The CIA actively concealed its activities there. These circumstances don't prove political intervention, but they create sufficient doubt to warrant reexamination under the veteran-friendly "benefit of the doubt" standard established in O’Hare v. Derwinski.
The Man Behind the Medal
Phil Conran is not seeking this recognition for himself. His USAF and CIA veteran supporters advocate on his behalf. With 21 decorations—including four Distinguished Flying Crosses, an Airman's Medal, a Purple Heart, and two Legions of Merit—his valor is beyond question. As a member of both the Air Commando Hall of Fame and the Legion of Valor of the United States of America, he already stands among the most distinguished airmen in our nation's history.
But this case is about more than one man. It's about whether we, as a nation, will allow bureaucratic errors and missing files to deny the rightful recognition of extraordinary heroism.
Conclusion: The Legal and Moral Imperative
The law is clear. When records are lost, the veteran receives the benefit of the doubt. When an agency cannot produce its original rationale, its decision cannot stand. When similarly situated individuals receive different treatment, equity demands correction.
Every legal principle - from Chenery to O'Hare to Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2009) - points to the same conclusion: Phil Conran's Medal of Honor recommendation must be reinstated.
The moral imperative is equally clear. Phil Conran risked everything in service to his country. The least we can do is ensure that his sacrifice receives its proper recognition, undiminished by lost paperwork and unexplained downgrades.
I urge you to right this historical wrong. Award Phil Conran the Medal of Honor that his actions earned in 1969. Justice may be delayed, but it must not be denied. The integrity of our military honors system - and our commitment to those who serve - demands nothing less.


Thomas Leo Briggs (GS-15 Ret)
CIA Special Operations Officer
Laos 1970-1972
President, CAVWV
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