PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO REMEDY RECOGNITION AND BURIAL LEGISLATION PASSED IN 2018
DRAFT PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 38 United States Code, Section 2402 Persons eligible for interment in national cemeteries Rev. 6 (1 May 2021 – Author: Thomas Leo Briggs)
INDEX
Page 1) Index Page 2) Executive Summary Page 3) Introduction Page 4) Designated Veterans Page 5) Amended Language Page 7) Appendix I – Existing Laws and Citations Page 12) Appendix II – General Background Information
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This amendment to 38 USC 2402 is intended to:
Replace Paragraph 10 of 38 USC 2402 in its entirety because Paragraph 10 of the current law is flawed and factually incorrect.
As of today, the laws in existence concerning the foreign allies who fought in the Vietnam War at the request and authorization of several Presidents of the United States, beginning with John F. Kennedy, are all grievously flawed. That they are flawed has resulted in Executive Branch agencies not being able to apply the laws and has resulted in grave injustices to our foreign allies who are presently naturalized United States citizens.
The law fails to recognize the extent of all covert activities conducted in the geographic area known as Southeast Asia during the war fought there from 1945 to 1975 to include covert combat in the Republic of Vietnam, the Kingdom of Laos, the Republic of Cambodia and in North Vietnam.
The law does not specify the requirements for documenting service as a veteran of the covert actions directed by the President of the United States.
The law fails to properly identify each ethnic group that fought clandestinely on behalf of the United States government in Southeast Asia.
The law fails to recognize that covert actions in Southeast Asia were conducted in accordance with the orders of several consecutive Presidents of the United States; that the President of the United States is the Supreme Commander of all United States Armed Forces; and that he commanded not only the United States armed forces in Southeast Asia but also those armed combatants who fought under the guidance of State Department’s American Ambassadors and officers of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The law limits recognition to those who immigrated into the United States under one specific law when all Asian indigenous covert combatants who immigrated legally into the United States ought to be recognized as long as the immigration was legal; and after legal immigration they became citizens or legal residents of the United States.
The law does not recognize that the staffs of any current Executive branch agency do not have experienced and knowledgeable members thus suggesting that the law recommend that advice and consent be sought from veterans’ groups, such as, the Coalition of Allied Veterans of the Vietnam War (CAVWV) and the Special Forces Association where both American and foreign veterans would be available for consultation.
INTRODUCTION
It is reasonably well known to the American public that a war, involving American armed forces, was fought in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) from 1965 to 1973. Also known, but only to some of the public, American armed forces also fought in the RVN in far lesser numbers from 1945 to 1965. These pre-1965 actions were less publicized and thus, less well-known while American combat actions from 1965 on are well documented in newspapers, books, movies and television.
However, there is a sub-text to the American activities in the RVN, that if better known, would elucidate and demystify American policy and activities, almost always covert in nature, throughout the RVN, North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (sometimes referred to as Southeast Asia or SEA) from 1945 to 1973, and in some cases beyond 1973 in Cambodia. For many years American presidents concealed these activities for various reasons, all of which are not germane to this discussion. It must be recognized that no matter how public opinion or the view of history may view the reasons for the official conduct of covert activities in SEA, those reasons do not pertain to whether or not various indigenous citizens of SEA did, in fact, accept America’s request to participate in the combat actions against the North Vietnamese invaders of the RVN, Laos and Cambodia.
The result of having participated in America’s covert actions in SEA is that not only have those actions not been well recognized, by the American public nor the government of the United States, but neither have all the indigenous combatants received recompense after having been forced to flee their homelands when the North Vietnamese achieved their goal of dominating all of SEA under communist control.
As will be seen in Appendix I (attached), over the years there has been some recognition of the covert activities of indigenous Asian allies for their combat activities in support of U.S. foreign policy, those activities all having been at the direction of the President of the United States, who is also the Commander of U.S. Armed Forces. Each instance of recognition, and in some cases recompense, was provided to only certain of the Asian indigenous allies, depending on the identity of the entity championing them.
This proposed amendment is intended to provide a particular recompense to all Asian indigenous allies, that is, burial rights in National Cemeteries for our allies and their spouses, without limiting the recognition to particular Asian ethnicities or the organization that directed them in their covert activities. DESIGNATED VETERANS
Naturalized Foreign National Combatants who were recruited, trained, commanded and carried out clandestine missions in the geographic area known as Southeast Asia (South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) under the orders and authorization of the President of the United States (per the Constitution, the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States) and also under the guidance of the Department of Defense and Commander of United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; or the guidance of the United States Ambassador to Laos or the United States Ambassador to Cambodia and the Central Intelligence Agency to include all Lao and Lao minorities, all Vietnamese and Vietnamese minorities, and all Khmer and Khmer minorities.
Foreign combatants were employed in North Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam, the Kingdom of Laos, and in Cambodia by both the U.S. military and the Central Intelligence Agency.
The U.S. military, specifically most often various special operations forces, employed ethnic Vietnamese, various Vietnamese mountain tribal minorities (known generically as Montagnards), Nung, ethnic Lao, Hmong, various Lao tribal minorities, and various ethnic Khmer and Khmer tribal minorities. It is not the intention here to try to name all the ethnicities of foreign combatants, leave it to say the above are some and a full accounting would identify more in detail. The greatest error is to single out only one of the many ethnic groups that participated in combat in the Vietnam War, whether overt or covert combat operations.
The Central Intelligence Agency also employed the same range of Vietnamese, Lao and Khmer ethnicities in its covert operations in the Republic of Vietnam, North Vietnam, the Kingdom of Laos and in Cambodia.
Thus, both the U.S. military and the Central Intelligence Agency were involved in carrying out presidentially authorized and ordered covert operations, at times separately and at other times jointly.
AMENDED LANGUAGE
38 United States Code, Section 2402, Paragraph 10:
Currently reads as follows:
Sec. 2402: (a) In general. Section 2402(a) of title 38, United States Code, Paragraph 10,
(b) (10) Any individual-- “(a) who-- “(i) was naturalized pursuant to section 2(1) of the Hmong Veterans’ Naturalization Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–207; 8 U.S.C. 1423 note); and “(ii) at the time of the individual’s death resided in the United States.”. (b) Effective date.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to an individual dying on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
[Strike] paragraph 10:
(10) Any individual-- “(a) who-- “(i) was naturalized pursuant to section 2(1) of the Hmong Veterans’ Naturalization Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–207; 8 U.S.C. 1423 note); and “(ii) at the time of the individual’s death resided in the United States.”. (b) Effective date.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to an individual dying on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Amend as follows:
(10) Any individual- (a) who-
(i) is a naturalized citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States; and
(ii) who served as a clandestine combatant with a special guerrilla unit, or irregular force, operating from a base in Laos under the guidance of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos and the Central Intelligence Agency in support of the United States foreign policy and the United States military; or
who served as a clandestine combatant with a covert irregular unit infiltrated into North Vietnam under the guidance of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group or its predecessors; or
who served as a clandestine combatant with an irregular unit operating covertly under the guidance of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group or its predecessors in the Republic of Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia; and
(iii) who as of 23 May 1975 is a naturalized citizen or a legal resident of the United States; and
(iv) who at the time of the individual’s death resided in the United States; and
(v) who documents his service with a clandestine irregular unit, as described in paragraph (ii) above, in the form of--
a. original documents; or
b. an affidavit of the serving person’s superior officer; or
c. two affidavits from other individuals who also were serving with such an irregular unit, and who personally knew of the person’s service; or
d. other appropriate proof; or
(vi) was the spouse of a person described in paragraph (ii) above on the day which such described person applied for admission to the United States or the day such described person became a naturalized U.S. citizen or a legal resident of the United States.
(b) Effective date.—The amendment made by subsection (A) shall apply with respect to an individual dying on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Deadline.- This Act shall apply to a person only if the person’s application for burial in any open national cemetery under the control of the National Cemetery Administration is submitted not later than 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
APPENDIX I EXISTING LAWS AND CITATIONS
1975 Public Law 94-23 Refugee Admission - (Lao, Cambodia & Vietnam)
After the end of American participation in the Second Indochina War in 1973, Congress passed and President Gerald Ford signed on 23 May 1975 Public Law 94-23: The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, which was a response to the Fall of Saigon. Under this act, approximately 130,000 refugees from South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were allowed to enter the United States under a special status, and the act allotted for special relocation aid and financial assistance.
1997 Public Law 104-201 & Public Law 105-18 Imprisoned in North Vietnam (Lao, Hmong, Vietnamese, Montagnard, Nung and Cambodian)
These laws refer to South Vietnamese as well as Hmong, Lao, Nung, Montagnard, Khmer and other minority volunteers, members of MACVSOG and CIA teams that infiltrated NVN, were imprisoned there, released after 20 years in prison and made it to the USA.
These commandos had at lest two champions, Rep. Loretta Sanchez, D-CA 46th District (she decided to run for the Senate in 2016 and lost), took up their cause and in 1997 (just guessing based on actions taken but possibly before); and the California American Legion.
Sanchez was probably instrumental (her name appears prominently in Congressional Record) in pushing through Public Laws 104-201 and 105-18.
While PL 104-201 authorized the payments the DoD objected and refused to make the payments, thus PL 105-18 was passed “For payments to individuals under section 657 of Public Law 104-201, $20,000,000, to remain available until expended.” The results were 266 claims processed and 142 payments of $40,000 approved to men like the Team Greco deputy team leader and Team Pegasus team leader. I say $40K each but I am not sure just how much was actually paid to each commando.
1998 Public Law 105-261 Payment for Service (Actions in North Vietnam) (Lao, Hmong, Vietnamese, Montagnard, Nung and Cambodian)
STROM THURMOND NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999 (17 Oct 1998). In 1999, PL 105-261 recognized the actions of Vietnamese, Lao, Hmong, Montagnard, Nung, and Khmer commandos. House Resolution 3616 (HR 3616) and Senate Resolution 2057 (S 2057) were introduced and were intended to address the heroism, sacrifice, and service of the military forces of South Vietnam, other nations, and indigenous groups in connection with the United States Armed Forces during the Vietnam conflict. Both resolutions went on to find: "indigenous groups, such as the Hmong, Nung, Montagnard, Kahmer (sic), Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai contributed military forces, together with the United States, during military operations conducted in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam conflict. Further that: Congress recognizes and honors the members and former members of the military forces of South Vietnam, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, as well as members of the Hmong, Nung, Montagnard, Kahmer (sic), Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai, for their heroism, sacrifice, and service in connection with United States Armed Forces during the Vietnam conflict.”
This refers to the activities of MACV Studies and Observation Group Oplan-34 and those of the CIA in mounting operations to penetrate North Vietnam and conduct espionage, sabotage, psychological warfare and other clandestine operations from 1961 to 1973. Both MACVSOG and the CIA used recruits from the South Vietnamese army as well as Hmong, Lao, Nung, Montagnard, Khmer and other minority volunteers they believed might be able to successfully penetrate North Vietnam and conduct clandestine operations there.
Thus, we have official recognition by Congress of indigenous minorities fighting on behalf of the U.S. government in a covert program to infiltrate North Vietnam to commit acts of sabotage, espionage, psychological warfare and other clandestine acts against the NVN government. This Public Law was signed by President Bill Clinton.
1980 Public Law 96-212 Refugee Admission, Resettlement, Permanent Residence (Lao & Hmong)
The largest wave of Lao and Hmong refugees arrived in the U.S. after the passage of Public Law 96-212, the US Refugee Act of 1980, an amendment to the earlier Immigration and Nationality Act and the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, and was created to provide a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to the United States of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the U.S., and to provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted.
This law does not address issues of naturalization.
2000 Public Law 106-207 Naturalization (Lao, Lao Theung & Hmong)
On 26 May 2000, Congress passed and President Bill Clinton signed Public Law 106-207: Hmong Veterans Naturalization Act of 2000 to facilitate the naturalization of aliens who served with special guerrilla units or irregular forces in Laos. This unfortunately named act covers anyone who served in a special guerrilla unit or irregular force in Laos not just those Hmong who so served. Despite the lack of understanding that more lowland Lao and Lao tribesmen (sometimes referred to as Lao Theung) served in the special guerrilla units or irregular forces than Hmong, all Lao, Lao tribesmen (Lao Theung) and Ethnic Lao, Lao tribal minorities, and Hmong were all recognized by this law to have earned the privilege of becoming naturalized citizens as a result of their service to the United States during the Second Indochina War.
It is ludicrous to describe this law as only applying to the Hmong minority in Laos.
2018 Public Law 115-141 Burial Rights (Lao, Lao Theung & Hmong)
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 - Became Public Law 115-141 - 3/23/2018 (signed by president). PL 115-141 contained within it the following which might be cited as PL 115-141, Division J, Title II, Sec. 251:
DIVISION J—Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018
TITLE II—Department of Veterans Affairs - Veterans Benefits Administration Administrative Provisions - (including transfer of funds)
SEC. 251. (a) In general.--Section 2402(a) of Title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(10) Any individual-- “(a) who-- “(i) was naturalized pursuant to section 2(1) of the Hmong Veterans’ Naturalization Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–207; 8 U.S.C. 1423 note); and “(ii) at the time of the individual’s death resided in the United States.”. (b) Effective date.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to an individual dying on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Annual admission of refugees and admission of emergency situation refugees
8 United States Code, Section 1423:
Requirements as to understanding the English language, history, principles and form of government of the United States
38 U.S. Code § 6105 - Forfeiture for subversive activities
(a) Any individual who is convicted after September 1, 1959, of any offense listed in subsection (b) of this section shall, from and after the date of commission of such offense, have no right to gratuitous benefits (including the right to burial in a national cemetery) under laws administered by the Secretary based on periods of military, naval, or air service commencing before the date of the commission of such offense and no other person shall be entitled to such benefits on account of such individual. After receipt of notice of the return of an indictment for such an offense the Secretary shall suspend payment of such gratuitous benefits pending disposition of the criminal proceedings. If any individual whose right to benefits has been terminated pursuant to this section is granted a pardon of the offense by the President of the United States, the right to such benefits shall be restored as of the date of such pardon.
25 October 2001 - the President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States awarded:
THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (ARMY) FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM TO THE STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP, UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
The Studies and Observations Group is cited for extraordinary heroism, great combat achievement, and unwavering fidelity while executing unheralded top secret missions deep behind enemy lines across Southeast Asia. Incorporating volunteers from all branches of the Armed Forces, and especially, U.S. Army Special Forces, Special Operation Group’s ground, air and sea units fought officially denied actions that contributed immeasurably to the American war effort in Vietnam. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group reconnaissance teams composed of Special Forces soldiers and indigenous personnel penetrated the enemy’s most dangerous redoubts in the jungled Laotian wilderness and the sanctuaries of eastern Cambodia. Pursued by human trackers and even bloodhounds, these small teams out-maneuvered, out-fought and out-ran their numerically superior foe to uncover key enemy facilities. rescue downed pilots, plant wiretaps, mines and electronic sensors, capture valuable enemy prisoners, ambush convoys, discover and assess targets for B-52 strikes, and inflict casualties all out of proportion to their own losses.
APPENDIX II GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION
"No event in American history is more misunderstood than the Vietnam War. It was misreported then, and it is misremembered now. Rarely have so many people been so wrong about so much. Never have the consequences of their misunderstanding been so tragic."
-Richard Nixon No More Vietnams, 1985
“Mythology, half-truth and falsehood concerning events in Vietnam abound and, unless corrected, will enter the textbooks for the mis-education of our children.”
-Guenter Lewy Professor (emeritus) of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst
The military history of Southeast Asia after the end of World War II (1945-1975) is marked by two wars fought in what was known as Indochina, considered by Ho Chi Minh to be all of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
NOTE: Calling it two wars takes into account the French and North Vietnamese communists fought the first war and the second war was fought between the North Vietnamese communists and the United States and its allies. Considering that the common denominator for both is the North Vietnamese communists one might view it all as the Indochina War.
Otherwise, these wars were:
First Indochina War: At the end of WW II, forces led by Ho Chi Minh, fighting to establish one nation under his control to include all of Indochina, fought the French who were trying to retain control of their colony, which also included all of Indochina. The United States aided the French with military supplies and conducted covert operations in Indochina during that time.
Second Indochina War: After the French loss of Dien Bien Phu and at the conclusion of the Geneva Conference of 1954 that resulted in a North Vietnam above the 17th Parallel under Ho Chi Minh’s control and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as independent nations, Ho Chi Minh pursued a policy of infiltrating those independent nations in order to conquer them and reunite them all under his rule. Beginning with President Eisenhower, followed by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, U.S. policy was to try to prevent Ho Chi Minh’s objective of subverting and conquering South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
President Eisenhower was concerned with Laos more than Vietnam and authorized DoD and CIA operations in Laos in the late 1950s and early 1960s. President Kennedy took command of American Armed Forces after his inauguration in 1961. His first concern was Laos and in early 1961 he authorized covert operations in Laos and also into North Vietnam. Later covert operations into Cambodia were also authorized and were conducted by both CIA and the DoD. The primary entity for conducting DoD covert operations in all of the countries of Indochina was the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Studies and Observation Group (MACVSOG or at times just MACSOG or SOG). As Commander-In-Chief of all American military forces the U.S. President authorized both the CIA and the DoD to conduct these covert operations. At times one or the other was the lead entity conducting operations in Cambodia, Laos or North Vietnam and at times both were conducting them at the same time.
However, in South Vietnam President Kennedy and his successors chose to conduct military operations solely under the command of the military theater commander, known as "Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam" (COMUSMACV). Covert operations were run by MACV into Laos, bordering South Vietnam, and into Cambodia, however, both the CIA and MACVSOG ran covert operations into North Vietnam. For covert operations in the rest of Laos the chain of command did not involve the Vietnam theater commander, COMUSMACV, but rather it ran through the U.S. Ambassador and then back to Washington, DC. There the chain of command became rather fuzzy and might include State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council or some special Council of advisors for affairs in Indochina. One thing is certain within this foggy chain of command, the U.S. President, as Commander-in-Chief was directing all overt and covert military conventional and unconventional operations in Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam.
These unusual arrangements were carried out for several reasons. First, the U.S. was a signatory to treaties that declared Laos and Cambodia neutral and the President did not want to publicly conduct overt military operations in these countries so as to publicly violate the treaties. Another reason was the worry that overtly violating the conditions of the treaties might result in a massive Soviet or Chinese response. The major DoD, State and CIA players in Washington did not believe that covert use of paramilitary or special operations forces in North Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia would successfully cause North Vietnam to cease its attempt to conquer and rule all of Indochina. However, doing nothing at that time when South Vietnam’s hold on that country was fragile posed the danger of South Vietnam falling under communist rule much sooner than later. Thus, covert operations into North Vietnam and Cambodia and in Laos were a means of diverting communist Vietnamese attention from being fully focused in South Vietnam and to use a significant portion of North Vietnamese military resources in those countries or for its own defense. Furthermore, in Laos no Royal Lao Government initiative to counter North Vietnamese violations of Lao sovereignty aimed at infiltrating South Vietnam was expected.
As war in South Vietnam ramped up from 1964-1965 on, and the numbers of American troops rose to eventually over 535,000 (with an additional 71,000 from Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand - not to mention the 1,110,000 South Vietnamese troops) the focus of the world turned to South Vietnam because the war was so big, it was overt, and it was covered by the media extensively. Even though the Second Indochina War was fought throughout Indochina only the part of it in South Vietnam was overt while the rest of it was covert and clandestine.
As events in Southeast Asia and Indochina have receded from current memory the Second Indochina War has become better known as the Vietnam War. Two factions are now at work spinning the events of the war in Indochina. On the one hand are those who were radical anti-war activists, draft dodgers, anti-war veterans and the media and academics who identified with the anti-war movement. On the other hand are those, in academia, the media, and veterans who do not stand with the anti-war movement. The voices of the anti-war movement have been louder than any others and many who came later to this history have been intellectually lazy in their pursuit of facts not driven by the anti-war movement, or at best remain ignorant of those facts. More so, it has been possible for anti-war activists to ignore the covert part of the Second Indochina War, or to obscure it with alternative facts that remain difficult to oppose because the U.S. government still chooses to treat the covert events of the Second Indochina war as secrets that must remain classified even now after all these years since the Paris Peace Accords, officially titled the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, signed on 27 January 1973. Even if the covert events are no longer classified, many who were not old enough to participate or to be aware seem to choose to make decisions in ignorance of the covert history of the Second Indochina War and to make decisions based solely on the alternative facts driven by the anti-war media, leftist academics and others with reason to reject or fabricate the truth.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Congress has, from time to time, confronted the reality of the covert portion of the Second Indochina War, though even while seeming to accept the truth, in reality ignoring the actual truth that the Second Indochina War was fought not only by Americans in South Vietnam but also in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by Lao, Hmong, Montagnard, Vietnamese, Khmer, Nung and other Indochinese indigenous peoples as volunteers under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, the President of the United States. At various times the Congress and the President have nibbled at the truth but have never really fully acknowledged it in its entirety.
Examples of this follow.
First, after the end of American participation in the Second Indochina War in 1973, Congress passed and President Gerald Ford signed on 23 May 1975 Public Law 94-23: The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, which was a response to the Fall of Saigon. Under this act, approximately 130,000 refugees from South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were allowed to enter the United States under a special status, and the act provided for special relocation aid and financial assistance.
Second, another action on the plus side of recognizing the actions of the Lao, Hmong, Lao Theung, Montagnard, Nung, Khmer and others in Indochina, occurred in the 105th Congress, in session in the two years 1997-1998. House Resolution 3616 (HR 3616) and Senate Resolution 2057 (S 2057) were introduced and were intended to address the heroism, sacrifice, and service of the military forces of South Vietnam, other nations, and indigenous groups in connection with the United States Armed Forces during the Vietnam conflict. Both resolutions went on to find: "indigenous groups, such as the Hmong, Nung, Montagnard, Kahmer (sic), Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai contributed military forces, together with the United States, during military operations conducted in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam conflict. Further that: Congress recognizes and honors the members and former members of the military forces of South Vietnam, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, as well as members of the Hmong, Nung, Montagnard, Kahmer (sic), Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai, for their heroism, sacrifice, and service in connection with United States Armed Forces during the Vietnam conflict."
This refers to the activities of MACV Studies and Observation Group Oplan-34 and those of the CIA in mounting operations to penetrate North Vietnam and conduct espionage, sabotage, psychological warfare and other clandestine operations from 1961 to 1973. Both MACVSOG and the CIA used recruits from the South Vietnamese army as well as Hmong, Lao, Nung, Montagnard, Khmer and other minority volunteers they believed might be able to successfully penetrate North Vietnam and conduct clandestine operations there.
The result was Public Law 105-261 - STROM THURMOND NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999 (17 Oct 1998). Thus, we have official recognition by Congress of indigenous minorities fighting on behalf of the U.S. government in a covert program to infiltrate North Vietnam to commit acts of sabotage, espionage, psychological warfare and other clandestine acts against the NVN government. This Public Law was signed by President Bill Clinton.
Third, on 26 May 2000, Congress passed and President Bill Clinton signed Public Law 106-207: Hmong Veterans Naturalization Act of 2000 to facilitate the naturalization of aliens who served with special guerrilla units or irregular forces in Laos. This unfortunately named act covers anyone, not just the Hmong, who served in a special guerrilla unit or irregular force in Laos. Despite the lack of understanding that more lowland Lao and Lao tribesmen (sometimes referred to as Lao Theung) served in the special guerrilla units or irregular forces than Hmong, all Lao, Lao tribesmen (Lao Theung) and Hmong were recognized by this law to have earned the privilege of becoming naturalized citizens as a result of their service to the United States during the Second Indochina War.
Fourth, on 25 October 2001 the President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States awarded:
“THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (ARMY) FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM TO THE STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP, UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM”
“The Studies and Observations Group is cited for extraordinary heroism, great combat achievement, and unwavering fidelity while executing unheralded top secret missions deep behind enemy lines across Southeast Asia. Incorporating volunteers from all branches of the Armed Forces, and especially, U.S. Army Special Forces, Special Operation Group’s ground, air and sea units fought officially denied actions that contributed immeasurably to the American war effort in Vietnam. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group reconnaissance teams composed of Special Forces soldiers and indigenous personnel penetrated the enemy’s most dangerous redoubts in the jungled Laotian wilderness and the sanctuaries of eastern Cambodia. Pursued by human trackers and even bloodhounds, these small teams out-maneuvered, out-fought and out-ran their numerically superior foe to uncover key enemy facilities. rescue downed pilots, plant wiretaps, mines and electronic sensors, capture valuable enemy prisoners, ambush convoys, discover and assess targets for B-52 strikes, and inflict casualties all out of proportion to their own losses.”
“When enemy counter-measures become dangerously effective, Studies and Observation Group operators innovated their own counters, from high altitude parachuting (HALO jumps) and unusual explosive devices, to tactics as old as the French and Indian War. Fighting alongside their Montagnard, Chinese Nung, Cambodian and Vietnamese allies, Special Forces-led Hatchet Force companies and platoons staged daring raids against key enemy facilities in Laos and Cambodia, overran major munitions and supply stockpiles, and blocked enemy highways to choke off the flow of supplies to South Vietnam.”
“Studies and Observation Group’s cross-border operations proved an effective economy-of-force, compelling the North Vietnamese Army to divert 50,000 soldiers to rear area security duties, far from the battlefields of South Vietnam. Supporting these hazardous missions were Studies and Observation Group’s own United States and South Vietnamese Air Force transport and helicopter squadrons, along with U.S. Air Force Forward Air Controllers and helicopter units of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. These courageous aviators often flew through heavy fire to extract Studies and Observation Group operators from seemingly hopeless situations, saving lives by selflessly risking their own. Studies and Observation Group’s Vietnamese naval surface forces – instructed and advised by U.S. Navy SEALS – boldly raided North Vietnam’s coast and won surface victories against the North Vietnamese Navy, while indigenous agent teams penetrated the very heartland of North Vietnam. Despite casualties that sometimes became universal, Studies and Observation Group’s operators never wavered but fought throughout the war with the same flair, fidelity and intrepidity that distinguished Special Operation Group from its beginning. The Studies and Observations Group’s combat prowess, martial skills and unacknowledged sacrifices saved many American lives, and provide a paragon for American future special operation forces.”
Fifth, during the 114th Congress (2015-2016) the House introduced, on 17 April 2015, H.Res. 210: Affirming and recognizing the Khmer, Laotian, Hmong, and Montagnard Freedom Fighters and the people of Cambodia and Laos for their support and defense of the United States Armed Forces and freedom in Southeast Asia. This resolution, asking for nothing more than recognition, ping-ponged from the House Foreign Affairs committee to the House Asia-Pacific Committee before dying without action. It is not known why this resolution, with 49 co-sponsors-26 Republican and 23 Democrat), died.
It is about time that the American public understand that the wars fought in Southeast Asia were in reaction to both North Vietnamese communist and American government policies: the North Vietnamese objective to subvert the independent nations of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and unite them all under North Vietnamese control reconstituting one Indochina; while the American objective was to prevent the intended North Vietnamese subversion of the three free, independent nations thereby thwarting North Vietnamese communist intentions.
Even though combat operations, sabotage, espionage, reconnaissance, and intelligence collection were conducted in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam covertly and did not come to light until years after those operations ceased, they were part of the overall American presidential policy to defend Southeast Asia also known as Indochina, and as such, should be known as the Second Indochina War. All those indigenous citizens of Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia who volunteered to assist the American government in covert, clandestine activities as surrogates for American troops on the ground should not be ignored for the manner in which American presidents chose to conduct this war. These heroic men ought to be properly recognized for what they did on our behalf.
Indigenous inhabitants of Indochina, i.e. Laos, Cambodia, South and North Vietnam, answered the call of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon and voluntarily served under the leadership of the U.S. Army Studies and Observation Group and the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct combat operations, intelligence collection, sabotage, and other clandestine operations following the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve the objective of his foreign policy in Southeast Asia.
The Lao, Lao Theung, Hmong and other minorities serving in Special Guerrilla Units in Laos; the Vietnamese, Montagnards, Nung, Khmer, other minorities and South Vietnamese in Special Commando Units and other MACVSOG covert units in both Cambodia and Laos; and the Hmong, Nung, Montagnard, Khmer, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, other minorities and North Vietnamese defectors serving in irregular covert teams infiltrating North Vietnam all fought for the United States, serving as surrogates for American soldiers.
There was more to the war in Vietnam than the combat in South Vietnam involving Americans. This was not just the Vietnam War, it was the Second Indochina War and was also fought in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia with the support of our allies among a variety of indigenous inhabitants of Indochina who fought covertly because that was American foreign policy. All veterans of that combat should be recognized by the United States government so that the history of the wars in Indochina is corrected.
NOTE: The largest wave of Lao and Hmong refugees arrived in the U.S. after the passage of Public Law 96-212, the US Refugee Act of 1980, an amendment to the earlier Immigration and Nationality Act and the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, and was created to provide a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to the United States of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the U.S., and to provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted.